真实需要与虚假需要
单向度思维成为了社会行为的一种形式，成为了需要形式的“潜化”。
“毫不奇怪，在工业文明的最发达地区，社会控制已被潜化到这样的地步，甚至连个人的抗议在根本上也受到影响。拒绝“随大流”的思想情绪显得是神经过敏和软弱无力的。这就是下述政治事件在社会心理上的反映:在工业社会前一阶段，那些历史力量的消逝，似乎代表着新的生存方式之可能。 但“潜化”一词或许不再说明个人是以什么方式自动重复社会所施加的外部控制并使之永恒化的。潜化使人联想到自我把“外部的”移置为“内部的”那一整套相对自发的过程。因此，潜化意味着存在一种区别于甚至敌对于外部要求的内心向度，即能把公众舆论和行为撇在一边的个体意识和无意识。“内心自由”的观念在这里有它的现实性，它指的是人们可以借以变成和保存“他自己”的私人空间。 今天，这一私人空间已被技术现实所侵占和削弱。大量生产和大量分配占据个人的全部身心，工业心理学已不再局限于工厂的范围。在几乎机械式的反应中，潜化的各种不同过程都好像僵化了。结果，不是调整而是模仿:即个人同他的社会、进而同整个社会所达到的直接的一致化。”[26]
《单向度的人》在社会历史层面论述了资产阶级内在性在人类需要上的崩溃。发达资本主义的无缝网络创造了马尔库塞所言的“不幸中的欣慰”，公民心甘情愿地被束缚着，享受着自身的全面动员。单向度思维的潜化带来了虚假需要，单向度思维认为当下世界不仅是所有可能的世界中最好的，而且是唯一可能的。马尔库塞认为，马克思主义者需要一种人类需要的理论，以便更好地理解今天虚假意识的制度化形式。 这显然源于他在书中对弗洛伊德剩余压抑和压抑性升华的讨论，在剩余压抑下，个体放弃了自身客观利益，内化了社会控制的极端制度要求，远离了解放的伟大承诺。法兰克福学派认为，为了改变人们认为能够在此时实现解放并品尝胜利果实的看法，有必要在发达资本主义内部进行经验性的总动员。马尔库塞的虚假需要理论丰富了他早先关于潜化和支配内化的观点。这一论点是在法兰克福学派二战后移民美国时提出的。正如皮科内先前指出的，美国的资本主义已经达到了最成熟的阶段，因此有必要进行总动员。《单向度的人》是20世纪30年代主题的普及和美国化，它带有偏向性，而非具体的社会历史分析。法兰克福学派的批判理论直接运用在了20世纪50年代的美国，在那里，意识形态的一致性和以虚假需要为形式的支配的潜化，比马尔库塞和他的同事在欧洲看到任何事物都要“发达”。 新世界的批判理论有三个特点。首先，在战后重建时期，美国凯恩斯主义国家对于经济的管理程度比在欧洲更高（欧洲本身也在马歇尔计划下进行重建）。其次，战时节制所带来的战后繁荣创造了大量的消费商品，提高了消费者的消费预期。最后，由于美国从来没有轰轰烈烈的社会主义运动，阶级冲突也会比较羸弱，所以国家干预和对人类需要无止境的操纵不会受到阻碍。由于没有一致的左翼反对派，战后重建越来越多地采用冷战的措辞，从而创造了一个没有敌人的“人为的否定”，积极地增强国内爱国主义和训导公民服从。20世纪50年代美国发达资本主义的政治和谐与社会心理和谐，要求将最初在《时代周刊》中用来描述资产阶级内部堕落的理论范畴具体化。 马尔库塞的需要理论建立在马克思的“作为社会需要的私人需要理论”基础之上。但由于马尔库塞抓住了生物学的核心，他在马克思有关需要的社会决定论中加入了对真正需要的设想，认为真正的需要源自爱欲的非压迫性升华。马克思没有花大量时间用以区分虚假的或真实的需要，因为在企业资本主义的早期阶段，需要没有被异化，“潜化”的问题也未曾出现。按照马克思的说法，工人们因绝对贫困而被迫采取行动，这就是革命转型的主要动力。马克思尚未预见到资本主义的高级阶段对资产阶级内部性的动员的结构性要求；因此，虚假需要未能进入马克思分析的视阈。 马尔库塞在马克思的基础上增加了生物学向度，使人区分真实需要和虚假需要：剩余压抑带来的虚假需要，这种需要不是在自我决定的状态下自由做出的；真实需要是经过非压抑性的俗化，在爱洛斯的外化中产生的需要。用早期马克思的话来说，真实需要是通过创造性的实践实现自我外化的需要。这种需要的特定形式并未引起马尔库塞的兴趣，正如他后来在《论解放》中所言，逐项列出需要的内容是乌托邦的做法。需要的内容只有在自我解放的大趋势下才能被确定；马尔库塞保留了马克思“打猎—捕鱼—从事批判”的幽默讽刺形象，这种形象能够轻松地转换角色，并以其对自我表达的普适性而著称。[27]马尔库塞同意马克思所说的，在自由的状态下，需要和创造性工作将会惊人般的呈现出各种形态。 虚假需要理论是实证主义文化对科技理性压迫功能的分析在人类“生物学”上的应用。单向度并不是无声无息笼罩我们的超个人以太；它是个人需要在现象学具体层面的再生产。因此，我们逐渐喜欢商店里的小玩意和物件，作为剥削性和空虚性工作的永恒焦虑的抚慰。古希腊亚里士多德的二元论所支持的劳动和闲暇的区分让满足被归入消费领域。但马尔库塞继承早期马克思的思想，认为最真实的需要是那些介于生产和消费之间的需要，能在生产性和创造性的工作中实现人性。马克思在《政治经济学批判大纲》中描述了生产和消费之间密切相连的关系，而马尔库塞则进一步分析了劳动闲暇二元论在服务虚假需要时的制度功能。单向度思维使我们忘记了，就连爱欲上的满足和愉悦都可以像在闲暇中得到满足那样在工作中得到实现。 西托夫斯基、海勒和莱斯等人对需要和消费的研究表明[28]，马尔库塞意义上的虚假需要本质上无法得到满足。莱斯认为，忙碌的消费者无法跟上商品不断变化的外观和诱惑。生态激进主义进一步认为，当能量和资源岌岌可危时，不可能通过无止境地提供商品去安抚被异化的工人消费者。当发达资本主义不能永无止境地生产商品时会发生什么？资本主义能在“稳定状态”下生存吗？正如我一向所主张的，这种消费者期望破灭的辩证法是发达资本主义最有力的危机点之一。虚假需要在本质上是短暂的，至少对虚假需要的满足在生态学上越来越不合理。 师承马尔库塞的莱斯认为解决办法在于，用可满足模式替代他所说的高强度市场环境。[29]从戈德温到马克思，小规模生产和消费一直是许多社会主义的夙愿。在这个意义上，西方对马克思主义的非极权解释一直避免将集中的政治经济学实体化（如国家社会主义模式），这种形式认识到技术的分散化与财富和权力的分散化是相辅相成的。事实上，对增长的初步限制和生态约束可能或许以偶然的方式提供了以激进方式改造社会的机会；在美国，对大政府和大企业的民粹主义怨恨可能转化为对植根于生产与消费、劳动与闲暇更加和谐的小规模社会主义的渴望。 比克尼在对“人为的否定”中提出，马尔库塞对单向度的描述，历史上属于早期垄断资本主义最具压抑性和整合性的时期；资本主义制度在更成熟的阶段逐渐放松了对主体性的束缚。比克尼认为，马尔库塞在认为虚假需要被整体化时，错误地外化了总动员的现实性。资本主义制度在更成熟的阶段不能脱离创造性的主体性投入而生存，这种主体性能通过精明的长期规划确保未来的利润。支配所有经验的官僚化资本主义必然会停滞不前。我认为比克尼对单向度的阶段划分是正确的。当今资本主义产生的需要，看似突破了50年代消费服从综合症。人为的否定成为了一种生活方式，持续关注个人成长和感性的培养。随着60年代新左翼反文化环境在80年代扩大为清醒的理论激进主义，这种由制度本身产生的消极情绪是否会激进起来？比克尼对此没有定论。 单向度阶段划分的重要性在于使批判理论保持辩证性。单向度是对马尔库塞“替代性选择的机会”的彻底否认。在《单向度的人》一书的导言中，马尔库塞认为革命形势是模棱两可的，但并不是完全没有希望。对单向度的认识本身构成了马尔库塞在书末所说的“大拒绝”，即通过个人选择对虚假需要的抽象否定。他在60年代后期的理论工作重点要解决的是，初始个体化的拒绝能否超越抽象的否定，从而实际地将个人的抵抗与规模更大的、甚至是阶级的抵抗联系起来。马尔库塞在1964年无法觉察到单向度的历史性，因此他容易将虚假需要永恒化，并对其废除不抱希望。有些批判将《单向度的人》仅仅视作为一本关于意识形态和观念的书，它们忽略了：在20世纪50年代末和60年代初，没有可靠的政治机器能将“大拒绝”扩大为政治行动。而马尔库塞本着30年代所写文章的精神，认为必须不惜一切代价抵制资产阶级内部性的堕落，哪怕只是在初始私有化条件下。
这是否意味着社会批判理论放弃了这一领域并把它交给了一种经验的社会学呢？这种经验的社会学除方法论的指导外避开任何理论的指导，它为一种谬误即不恰当的具体性所支配，因而虽在起着意识形态的作用却宣称排除价值判断。或者，辩证概念把它自己的处境理解为它所分析的社会的处境，从而再次证明了它的真理性吗？如果人们考虑到批判理论的最大弱点，即没有能力在已确立的社会范围之内中表明解放的趋势，就能找到答案。 社会批判理论在其起源时期，曾经面对过在已确立的社会中出现的实际力量(客观的和主观的),那已确立的社会通过废除已成为进步障碍的现存体制而向着(或被引导到向着)更合理、更自由的体制迈进。这些体制是批判理论得以建立的经验根据;批判理论从这些经验根据引出了具有内在可能性的解放的观念——在其他情况下就会被阻碍和歪曲的物质和精神的生产率的发展、才能及需要的发展。没有这样的力量作证,社会批判虽也是有根据且合理的，但却没有能力将其合理性转化为历史实践。结论是什么？“具有内在可能性的解放”不再是历史的替代选择的充分表达。[30]
这就引出一个关键问题，即虚假需要潜在的自我超越。在此，马尔库塞含蓄地重新回答了自卢卡奇以来西方马克思主义的重要议题。对自我伤害的需要的克服必须是一种努力，单纯在自我矛盾的经济结构的普遍冲突并不会给予保障。既然马克思主义不是决定论，因此资产阶级个人必须同时在意识层面和欲望层面，利用批判性反思来消除自己被扭曲的需要。个人是变革实践的第一战场。因此，马尔库塞并没有在个人自我转变和阶级激进主义之间作出选择，而是认为阶级激进主义始于个人的自我转变。个人之所以成为战场，正是因为单向度有摧毁资产阶级个体性的可能；没有这种个体性——一个至少在思想和感觉上坚决反对集体管理的个体——阶级斗争严格来说是不可能的。卢卡奇的集体主体只存在于斗争的个人之中，并只有通过斗争的个人才能获得实现。
March 14, 2000
Herbert Marcuse
a. Background
Herbert Marcuse (1898-1979) was of German, Jewish background and studied philosophy at Berlin and Freiburg. He was a part of the Institute for Social Research in its early days in Germany, went to the United States in 1934, initially joined Columbia University, and later taught at Harvard, Brandeis, and the University of California at San Diego. While he was associated with the Institute from the early days, he achieved greatest fame in the 1960s, as a guru of the new social movements that emerged in the United States and Western Europe. His writings provided a critical view of the capitalism and modernity that existed in the mid-twentieth century, with an historical and social analysis. One difficulty with the approach he developed was that he did not provide a political or social guide to those who attempted to counteract the powerful forms of control and limits on true freedom that he described. In spite of this, his critical analysis provided social movement activists with an analysis (perhaps a misleading one) of what could be considered wrong with modern society. In addition, Marcuse was sympathetic to the new social movements (student, anti-war, feminist, civil rights, gay rights), and considered them to point a way to change, even though his writings were pessimistic about such change.
In addition to One-Dimensional Man (1964), the main writings of Marcuse were Reason and Revolution (1941), Eros and Civilization (1955), Soviet Marxism (1958), and An Essay on Liberation (1969). Marcuse did not just critique western society but also Soviet society and the socialism of Eastern Europe. In general, his writings show a concern with issues of human liberation in general.
b. Psychoanalytic Theory
Elliott (pp. 177-8) discusses the psychoanalytic theories of Marcuse, which Marcuse developed in Eros and Civilization. Like other critical theorists, he used ideas from Freud, but connected psychological repression with political repression, examining how "capitalism and mass culture shape personal desires" and how human emancipation might be achieved. For Marcuse, all societies require some repression – what Marcuse termed basic repression – but capitalism leads to crippling repression, or what he termed "surplus repression." In order to society to operate, some repression of sexual and other desires is necessary. But capitalism represses inner desires even more than other systems through asymmetrical power relationships and the requirements associated with exchange values. The changes in the economy, technology, and culture have created an escalation in repression, resulting in manipulation or destruction of the subject. The result is "an authority bound, easily manipulable modern subject" who is "subject to decomposition and fragmentation" (p. 178), so that the personal becomes merely a component of the system of domination. Elliott notes that for Marcuse, emancipation would be "reconciliation between culture, nature, and unconscious pleasure … ‘libidinal rationality’" (p. 178). While Marcuse developed an excellent analysis of these problems, it is not clear from his writings how this authority and surplus repression can be ended.
c. One-Dimensional Man
Background. In One-Dimensional Man, Marcuse addresses many of the same issues, but changes emphasis to the forces associated with ideology, communication, public discourse, and critical thought (or the lack of it). In this work Marcuse stresses the forces of technology and rationality rather than the psychoanalytic, extending Weber’s analysis and that of earlier critical theory. Marcuse appears to argue that instrumentally rational forms have taken over from more substantively rational forms. While Marcuse uses dialectical forms of analysis, he argues that modern, capitalist society has become one-dimensional, a society without opposition, but dominated by organized forces that limit opposition, choice, and critique. This society is not obviously totalitarian, in that there appears to be democracy, liberty, and freedom, but true opposition and radical change are foreclosed because of the ways this society is organized – the society appears open and tolerant but is able to absorb dissent and opposition and make is socially useless or ineffective. (Notes in this paragraph based on the introduction to Chapter 15 of Farganis).
Marcuse considered the proletariat and other groups within modern society to be unable to form and exercise critical judgments and power. The traditional Marxian agents of change are trapped within the dominant discourse of one-dimensional thought. Calhoun argues that in this work, Marcuse worked within the "Frankfurt paradigm that expected radical change to emerge from radical negativity, from those most objectively disempowered by existing arrangements, those whose existence was most opposed to the established order" (p. 450). As a result, Marcuse placed some hope on groups that were outside of the dominant discourse of the society, groups such as students, outcasts, and minority groups, and perhaps other new social movements. While he was not as pessimistic and Horkheimer and Adorno, Marcuse in One-Dimensional Man he does not lay out a political program or a clear vision of social progress.
Notes on Marcuse – Ch. 1 of One-Dimensional Man
Overpowering forces of technological and administrative order.
Potential for human freedom and how it might be achieved.
Possibilities for progressive changes – but Marcuse ambivalent about these.
Influences of Weber, Marx, Freud and other classical social theorists.
Continued work in the critical theory tradition, updated to the United States of the 1960s.
i. Technological Order or Organization. Mechanization, concentration, regularization, curtailment, and coordination characterize an ordered society or an organized form of individualism. While this may appear to be democratic, free, and rational, in fact the society and individuals in it are organized in a technical manner to suppress individuality.
ii. Democracy and Progress. Historically, freedom and democracy had a critical edge to them, so that they were part of social progress. These ideas and forces helped to overcome traditional limits, presumably the limited possibilities associated with technology and the forces of production in the pre-industrial era, and the ideas and culture that formed part of these earlier social forms. But these ideas of liberty and individual rights were so successful that they became incorporated into the institutions and structures of society – thus cancelling their premises. Marcuse argues dialectically here, noting how a set of progressive forces develops historically, turning into its opposite.
iii. Freedom from Want (pp. 1-2). The basis for true human freedom for Marcuse is to have an economic system which can provide sufficient goods and services to meet the needs (later in the chapter the true needs) of members of the society. Increasingly, societies are capable of providing this, much more so than earlier societies with their limited productive potential. But the associated effects of this include a blunting of the critical aspects of individuality, thought, and political opposition. Rather, dissent, opposition, and non-conformity can be accommodated within the system by limiting the range of alternatives that are presented. While such limits on freedom may seem part of a totalitarian political and social structure, for Marcuse there may be little difference between nominally free and democratic societies and those that are totalitarian.
iv. Goals of Civilization (pp. 2-3). The higher productivity of modern forms of economic production could lead to the possibility of real freedom – so people would not be limited by the requirements to produce the necessities of life. Rather, such productive potential could produce a new form of human freedom, where the individual "would be free to exert autonomy over a life that would be his own" (p. 2) and this would make true autonomy possible for the individual. Note the similarity to the Marxian view of a communist society. Also note a certain emphasis on individualism on p. 2, perhaps an essential one, so that the individual can truly be himself or herself in these circumstances. This latter argument would seem asocial and might deny some of the social aspects of individuality and the self.
Instead, a totalitarian system emerges where the "apparatus imposes it economic and political requirements" (top of p. 3). This is the totalitarian aspect of the administered society – that is, it is a total system in that there is "manipulation of needs by vested interests" so that needs, or the manner in which needs are met, are constrained within limits that prevent critique and opposition from emerging. In such a system, there may be political parties, several news sources, or countervailing powers (a reference to a set of arguments concerning liberalism that was expressed in the 1960s), but this is not real critique or opposition, rather the boundaries of debate are closely circumscribed within certain legitimate limits. Also note the functional and conspiracy aspects of this argument in that vested interests manipulate things with specific purposes in mind.
v. Political Power, Technology, and Dialectic (p. 3). Marcuse emphasizes machines, technology, and science in this paragraph, coming close to a certain type of technological determinism associated with the efficiency and productivity of these technologies. However, he maintains a dialectical approach by noting that these technologies could form the basis for human freedom (again a technological argument, although in the reverse direction), but instead become a political instrument for maintaining order for the society as a whole. We are told about the need to work efficiently and productively and to adopt the new technologies, and these organize the labour force and the whole of society to maintain and extend the administered form of organization.
vi. Negations. On p. 4 Marcuse develops the ideas on p. 3 by noting that freedom cannot be attained within the framework and limits of the organized, total, administered society. Rather, freedom would be a rejection or a negation (Hegel and Marx) of economics, politics, and public opinion. It is these latter forces that from the administered society and limit and constrain freedom and individual autonomy. Marcuse notes that this may sound unrealistic, and this in itself is evidence of the totalizing nature of thought which forecloses even the imagination of alternatives.
vii. Needs. On pp. 4-6, Marcuse introduces an important aspect of his work – the difference between true and false needs and the implications of this. He notes that needs are always historically developed and also socially developed and constrained (critical standards). That is, while there are biological aspects to needs (food and shelter), the manner in which these are met is historically and socially constructed. The social aspect of needs and their satisfaction is described in the middle paragraph of p. 5 – they are products of a repressive, dominant society even though the individual may identify with them. But was it ever different? [This may always have been the case, and this may not be a unique feature of modern capitalism.]
Near the top of p. 5, Marcuse argues that even though the individual may be euphoric, have fun, be able to relax, and be comftorable, so long as these needs are associated with advertising, consumer culture, and organized by the totalizing society, there are "false needs." [Exactly how Marcuse makes this judgment is not clear – it almost appears tautological in that he argues that society creates these needs and, by definition, they must thus be false. To me, this appears to be an elitist form of judgment].
Not only are the needs false, they are repressive in that they repress some other needs and alternatives. Exactly what these alternatives might be is not clear, although Marcuse gives some indication that there vital needs such as nourishment, cloting and lodging. He does admit that these must be met at the prevailing standard, and that these lead to other needs. But exactly what vital and true needs are is not too clear from this section of the chapter.
At the same time, this is a critique of advanced, industrial, capitalist society, where artificial needs are created and where some forms of consumption and uses of society’s productive resources clearly are unnecessary. Further, the view that needs are historically and socially constructed is an important one. It just seems that Marcuse feels able to judge what is true and what is false – what are the standards for this? Near the top of p. 6 he argues that these could be determined by reason, but is this the same reason which led to the problems in the first place?
Later on p. 6 he argues that it is the individuals themselves who must decide, but then argues that they do not have the autonomy to do so. He notes that even though a tribunal could not do this, the question remains.
viii. Suffocation of Liberating Needs. Marcuse appears to have a way out here – he argues that it is needs which would lead to liberation are the ones that are suppressed. [What might some of these be?] Instead, needs associated with destructive and repressive functions, wasteful activities, and excess work are maintained. Marcuse argues that some of these are relaxation to soothe problems [drugs, alcohol] and features such as seeming choice at excess price. He emphasizes the lack of true choice here – free press with limited range of information and different consumer goods and services that differ little in any true sense. Further, it is the presentation of choice that is itself an element of domination, and a very effective means for those administering society to maintain this administration.
Note the shift in emphasis from a Marxist perspective which would examine work and labour in more detail. Near the bottom of p. 5 there is reference to "all those whose misery is the price of his satisfaction" and on p. 8 a reference to "a life of toil and fear." Also, on p. 8 he recognizes that class differences exist, but argues that they are not decisive. But for the most part, this is subsidiary and almost incidental, whereas Marcuse places great emphasis on consumption, needs, and choice, all elements associated with the consumption and distribution, not the production, sector of society. His administered and totalized society may have economic necessity behind it, or that is assumed, but the focus is clearly not on this, but the need to maintain the social order and administer the alternatives so that issues related to critique, true needs, liberty, and autonomy do not emerge. Some of these may be economic, but more important appears to be an emphasis on politics, ideology, and consciousness.
ix. Preconditioned. Note how Marcuse follows up on the latter points on pp. 8-9 by de-emphasizing class distinctions, arguing instead that images, ideology, the media, social needs, etc. dominate. Each individual is preconditioned (remember Fromm and his arguments concerning the family and administered society) to accept the range of options presented in the media. So it is in the lifestyle and consumption sphere, not in production, that the administered society finds it strength.
x. Rational Irrationality (p. 9). While Marcuse may have abandoned the productivist economic model of Marx, he does not abandon the dialectical aspect of Hegel and Marx. Waste is turned into need (consumerism and throwaway society), destruction into construction (war, environment). Even alienation is questionable since the mind and body become extensions of the social. [Does this differ from mechanical solidarity, and if so, how?] Within this society, Marcuse argues that consumption ends up becoming the means of finding self, so there is no separation of essence from humans, and "creativity" may be found in consumption. This is a turning around of the aims of rationality, so that the seemingly rational becomes irrational, and the individual becomes so tied to the society that the new needs created by society become a means of social control, rather than needs being the source of competition and debate, as in earlier societies.
xi. Technological Control (p. 9). Technical control was traditionally associated with the use of force but in modern society technology is associated with Reason which appears to benefit everyone. How many times have we heard how the new technologies are more productive, efficient, and the means of human betterment – medicine, genetic engineering, communications, electronic technologies. Opposing these seems to be irrational, in that opposition appears to oppose technology that seems progressive. Those who oppose these new developments are often looked on as being backward and narrow.
xii. Protest? (pp. 9-10). The result of these new forms of technological control are to make protest useless and neurotic. Marcuse returns to these points on p. 14, where he argues that spiritual or lifestyle forms of opposition can do little to change things. Rather, these become incorporated into the status quo. Note that Marcuse argues on p. 14 that these forms of protest are "no longer negative" thus aligning his views with critical theory that the sources of change need to be a form of negativity toward the all-encompassing administered society.
xiii. Self. On p. 10, Marcuse addresses the concept of self, one that is reminiscent of psychoanalytic approaches or of Mead. He notes that the self usually developed through "relatively spontaneous processes" whereby there is an inner and an outer, a conscious and an unconscious. This leads to a sort of inner freedom where an individual can be himself or herself. This may have been the case in earlier periods, but Marcuse argues that this has changed to a system of mimesis (mimic, imitation of actions of others) so that there is "an immediate identification of the individual with his society and, through it, with the society as a whole." This is a destruction of the self, or a new form of self, something like the evaporated self mentioned by Giddens. Note here that Marcuse (bottom of p. 10) argues that this may have existed in earlier forms of society, with association or mechanical solidarity. What is different is its re-emergence in the modern, whereby there are forces that organize this – scientific management (advertising, management of consumption, e.g. theme parks, popular culture). Again Marcuse notes how the negative of critical thinking is denied (dialectic).
xiv. Alienation. On p. 11, Marcuse argues that alienation has reached a new stage, whereby there is alienation, but the subject does not recognize this. Alienation is the separation of human essence from the individual, either in psychological or material form. But when reality is identification of individuals with the organization imposed on them, and their selves are tied up in such identification, this is no longer the alienation described by Marx. That is, the supposedly alien is no longer outside and separated from the individual, but becomes part of the individual. As a result there is no more false consciousness, whereby the objective interests of people differ from what they perceive to be their interests.
xv. Ideological. Some liberal writers in the 1960s, such as Daniel Bell, noted much the same thing, and argued that the old ideologies of Marxism and anti-Marxism were now irrelevant. In contrast, Marcuse argues that the process he descibes has become even more ideological in that it is not limited to the realm of ideas, justification, and politics. Rather, the ideas and justification of the system have become part of the productive apparatus itself. The needs associated with production become the needs of the members of society, and the two are bound together in a way that is one-dimensional and "militates against qualitative change" (p. 12). Note that Marcuse does not argue that this creates scarcity, inequality, or suffering – rather, this whole effect results from a certain degree of plenty and it is in many ways a good way of life.
xvi. Critique of Science. On pp. 12-14, Marcuse outlines a critique of operationalism, behaviorism, and empricism in the various sciences, thus restricting meaning and creativity. This mode of operation eliminates troublesome questions and accommodates different aspects that might initially seem threatening.
xvii. Politics and Media. Here Marcuse critiques the supposedly free societies of the west, and contrasts them with the supposedly totalitarian socialist societies. But Marcuse is critical of both, noting certain similarities. Certainly he is critical of the limited forms of freedom which characterize the west.
In earlier periods, there was scarcity, misery, and injustice which provoked rebellion against the dominant discourse. In a sense, the problems of society kept the rulers honest, in the sense that they had to pay attention to these various forms of opposition. This has now more or less disappeared. On p. 15, Marcuse returns to the critique of science and operationalism.
xviii. Progress. Marcuse discusses the meaning of progress, attempting to return to the victory of the struggle against nature predicted by Marx. However, Marcuse notes that what counts as progress in contemporary society actually limits rationality, so the nature of progress will have to change in a radical manner – although exactly what this is, is not outlined in this chapter.
xix. Technological Rationality. On p. 17, Marcuse notes the importance of technological rationality and the efforts to contain this within the institutions of society. He regards this rationality as irrational. Here he returns to the Weberian distinction between rationality of means and ends. The rest of the chapter furthers this argument, noting how technological rationality is concerned with domination and can become totalitarian.
xx. Conclusion on Marcuse. In this chapter, Marcuse does not offer anything in the way of solution to the problems he notes, almost arguing that the radical negativity associated with earlier forms of progress is not possible in contemporary modernity. He echoes the themes of the critical theorists concerning organized, administered society and its all-encompassing effects on society, individuals, the self, and communication. As source of this he identifies instrumental rationality and a form of technological rationality as the driving force toward uniformity, creation of needs, perpetuation of this rationality, and leading to a one-dimensional form of society that is ultimately irrational.
References
Braaten, Jane. 1991. Habermas’s Critical Theory of Society. Albany: State University of New York Press.
Farganis, James. 1996. Readings in Social Theory: The Classic Tradition to Post-Modernism. New York: McGraw-Hill.
Kellner, Douglas. 1989. Critical Theory, Marxism and Modernity. Oxford: Polity Press.
Kellner, Douglas. 1990?. Critical Theory and the Crisis of Social Theory. from Illuminations, http://www.uta.edu/huma/illuminations/kell.htm
Kellner, Douglas. 1995. Media Culture: Cultural studies, identity and politics between the modern and the postmodern. London and New York: Routledge.
Ritzer, George. 1996. Sociological Theory, fourth edition. New York: McGraw-Hill.
Wallace, Ruth A. and Alison Wolf. 1999. Contemporary Sociological Theory: Expanding the Classical Tradition, fourth edition. Upper Saddle River, N. J.: Prentice Hall.
Last edited on March 14, 2000.